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European integration in crisis? Of supranational integration, hegemonic 
projects and domestic politics1 
 
Introduction  
The European Union currently faces many challenges. A decade-long attempt at 
constitutional reform nearly foundered as a result of the French and Dutch 
electoratesǯ rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the Irish ǯǡ
December 2009. That step coincided with the emergence of the ongoing 
Eurozone crisis, which revealed the EU institutions and the member states as 
slow to react and politically weak in the face of the financial markets. Germany 
reluctantly moved to the fore amidst the leadership vacuum, with the traditional 
Franco-German motor having lost power. The Eurozone crisis and the linked 
economic and financial crisis have contributed to greater Euroscepticism as  ? ? ? ?Ǥǯ
to the foreign policy crisis on its doorstep in Ukraine has been hesitant. A refugee 
crisis threatened EU asylum and migration policy, opening up new divisions 
between states. Finally, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, wishes to secure 
EU reform prior to holding an in/out referendum. 
 
 Theorizing integration is once again under the spotlight. The main 
contending theories reveal insights but also significant flaws in explaining these ǤǮǯǤȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
has suggested that integration theories should be turned on their head in order 
to offer predictions about the conditions under which disintegration might take 
place (see also Eppler and Scheller 2013; Vollaard 2014). 
 
 Our argument seeks to re-examine the dynamics of integration. It does so 
by embracing recent developments in international relations (IR) theory, notably 
the structure-agency debate, in order to connect up the international level of 
integration with domestic politics. The novelty of our argument is to understand 
European integration as the outcome of contestation between rival hegemonic 
projects. Hitherto when the EU is understood as a hegemonic project it is 
typically seen in economic or class terms and as an integral part of the dynamics 
of transnational capitalism. Our interpretation is different, although it engages 
with this approach. First, our analytical focus is on European integration rather 
than seeing the EU as simply an artefact of the global political economy or the 
product of a transnational elite. Secondly, we argue that integration has always 
been both economic and political in character and that domestic social relations 
need to be added to global developments in identifying the way European 
integration is shaped.  European integration may indeed be about embedded 
neoliberalism (van Apeldoorn 2001), although this was not the case in the 1950s. 
However, it is also about the empowerment of political elites with good access to ǯ-making centre to the cost of those less well positioned. We 
                                                        
1 We would like to thank Nat Copsey, Defne Gunay, Owen Parker, Willie Paterson, Uwe Puetter, 
Robbie Pye, Douglas Webber and Antje ǯ
their comments on earlier versions of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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therefore explore integration as the outcome of a struggle for power amongst 
competing hegemonic projects.  
 
 We develop our argument to facilitate a dialogue with both mainstream 
and critical approaches. Our focus on hegemonic projects is distinctive in placing 
emphasis on historical context, institutional setting, the multiple levels of the 
integration process and the underlying structural conditions that enable and 
constrain action. Developing a notion of hegemonic projects in relation to the 
above issues departs from simply critiquing neoliberalism. At the same time it 
permits meaningful dialogue with institutionalist approaches, while engaging 
with recent ontological developments in political studies, namely critical realism 
and the structure-agency debate. We develop a distinctive argument that 
hegemonic projects represent a mediating point between macro structure, 
institutional structures and active agency.  
 
 The paper is structured in five parts. First, it offers a brief review of the 
principal integration theories in the light of post-Lisbon/Eurozone crisis, linking 
them to neo-Gramscian scholarship. Secondly, it builds on IR scholarship on the 
structure-agency debate in order to develop a way of understanding the 
relationship between supranational integration, domestic politics and 
underlying structures. Thirdly, it explores how European integration can be 
considered the outcome of competing hegemonic projects with their roots in 
domestic politics. Fourthly, it examines the current crisis to reveal what our 
approach can add to existing analysis. Finally, we conclude. 
 
Theorising integration  Ǥǯ
classification (2009: 7) it comprises not only the classical theories that seek to 
explain the trajectory of European integration, but also encompasses the 
governance turn of the 1980s and the sociological and critical turns from the  ? ? ? ?ǤǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍǡ
general theory rather than with particular instances. We also seek to incorporate ǮǯǤ 
 
 We understand integration to be a process that is political, economic and 
social, with a legal dimension as well. Integration theory is thus concerned with 
the dynamics behind the transfer of competencies and allegiances to the EU level 
from the member states. Such shifts may occur through adding new policy 
sectors, such as fiscal union, new institutional transfers of power, such as to the 
European Parliament, or through enlargement. 
 
We offer a brief review of the current state-of-the-art of integration 
theorizing before suggesting a way forward that connects with neo-Gramscian 
literature on the EU. The long-standing theoretical debates about integration 
continue (see Wiener and Diez 2009 for an overview). Neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism have both been deployed in the current crisis, while 
postfunctionalism also offers analytical purchase on recent events. 
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Neofunctionalist readings of the Eurozone crisis have concentrated on the 
transfer of new areas of policy responsibility to the EU level, notably on fiscal 
policy and the banking union. Amongst the neofunctionalist analyses have been 
Schimmelfennig (2012; 2014) and Niemann and Ioannou (2015). 
Neofunctionalist spillover has also been invoked as an explanation in the work of 
Epstein and Rhodes (2014) on banking union. For example, Niemann and ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯǡ
notably strong monetary integration alongside weak fiscal supervision, indicated 
the need for functional spillover. Furthermore, the sheer unpredictability of a 
Eurozone break-upȄat least in 2010/11Ȅencouraged political leaders to build 
on the existing EMU design. Taken together, these factors dynamised a logic of 
functional spillover to add the missing parts of the design. According to Niemann 
and Ioannou (2015: 205-12), interest groups, financial markets and 
supranational institutions offered vital inputs into the resultant fiscal and 
banking regulatory regimes. 
 
The liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) of Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998) Ǯdefaultǯ. A Ǯǯ
form of preference formation underpins a pattern of interstate bargaining that 
privileges the position of large states and leads to specific delegations of power 
to the EU. Its proposition that governments may delegate powers to the 
supranational institutions under carefully controlled conditions has also found 
resonance in the current crisis. Schimmelfennig (2015a) has deployed LI to ǮǯǤǮǯ
excluded the option of a break-up of the Euro. Consequently, intergovernmental 
brinksmanship resulted in the creditor states, especially Germany, determining 
the rescue terms. Delegation of powers on fiscal supervision and banking 
regulation was needed to provide (carefully circumscribed) credible 
commitments in line with LI to ensure the continuation of the Euro. 
 
Beyond the specifics of the Eurozone crisis Bickerton et. al. (2015a; 
2015b) have advanced a slightly different version of intergovernmentalismȄǮǯȄto explore a new pattern of integration that they 
attribute to the post-Maastricht period. They seek to avoid some of the 
reductionism of LI while emphasising the deliberative dimension of inter-state 
bargaining, as states seek to build a consensus on key agreements. Their 
contribution has already encountered critical appraisal (see Schimmelfennig 
2015b; Bulmer 2015) and a rejoinder (Bickerton et. al 2015c). Its newness has 
been challenged, while a separate critique is that new intergovernmentalism is a 
misnomer for the time-frame in light of the greater functional integration in the 
post-Maastricht period. 
 
Postfunctionalism (Hooghe and Marks 2009) is a further contribution to ǤǮǯ
integration in the politicisation that has developed in elections and referendums. 
Thus the increased hold of public preferences over those of elites or 
governments explains the trajectory of integration from this perspective. 
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These different approaches offer alternative and sometimes conflicting 
accounts of integration. Thus, as Ioannou et. al. ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǡǮa division of 
labour between them may add up to a larger picture, in the sense of additive 
theory ǥwithout being combined or subsumed into a single grand theory 
through full-fledged synthesisǯǤǡ
between and within the positions rather over-shadows the commonalities in the 
approaches. As Magnus Ryner (2012: 654) has argued, Ǯuropean integration ǯǮǯand the ǮǯǤǡǡ
more critical approaches to understanding integration, including political 
economy. His analysis chimes with the observation that neofunctionalism and LI 
are competing hypotheses based on the same ontological assumptions about 
European integration.  
 
We seek to be more open in our understanding of integration, eschewing 
some of the rationalist and deterministic characteristics of the theories. Indeed, 
our ambition is to advance a critical integration theory in its own right. By 
considering European integration as the outcome of competing hegemonic 
projects we seek to offer a fuller account of the political and economic struggles 
involved, linking political and economic contestation to a threefold model of ǯǡǤ 
 
To a degree our approach draws on neo-Gramscian arguments. However, 
the application of Gramsci to the EU is still quite limited and, by and large, does 
not engage much with the integration literature, suggesting a failure to engage 
with the EU as something with its own specific dynamics. There are two 
applications 
Ǥ
ǯ
foil to the dominant IR usage. It places most emphasis on the cultural and 
ǯ
process. Diez (2013: 200) considers hegemony in relation to the normative 
power debate and defines it as the ability to shape conceptions of the normal. 
This approach is close to constructivism and does not leave much space for the 
analysis of either material relations or structure (conceived as social relations 
rather than something normative).  
 
By contrast, an international political economy (IPE) approach fits the EU 
into a wider neoliberal project rather than problematising European integration 
itself. Thus, Bieler and Morton (2001: 4) argue that the 1995 EU enlargement has 
to be understood in terms of the transnationalisation of production and finance 
that constitutes globalisation. This in turn is reduced to a class struggle 
perspective that emphasizes the consensual and ideological character of 
hegemony (2001: 16-20). 
ǯǮǯis more specific in 
examining new forms of political governance and the redesign and Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤHowever, it is notable that there is a lack 
of recent literature dealing with the current crisis of European integration ǯȋ ? ? ? ?: 276) account of ordoliberalism is a notable exception 
that correctly identifies two tendencies in critical IPE Ȃto reduce hegemony to 
either a transnational capitalist class or German dominance. ǯ
draws attention to the variegated European response to global change.  
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Van Apeldoorn also sees the Gramscian bloc as a neoliberal one, but uses Ǯǯ to its contested nature. While 
embedded neoliberalism is engendered by the capitalist production process, 
transnational neoliberal social forces must engage with alternative European 
socio-economic interests (van Apeldoorn 2001: 79). Thus he talks of the Ǯǯ
market forces and freedom of transnational capital, and the need to embed these 
in a compromise with the subordinate interests of productive capital and 
organized labour. The German socio-economic model, reflecting both the former 
(neo-mercantilism and ordoliberalism) and the latter (corporatism) is of 
particular importance to a successful embedding of neoliberalism (van 
Apeldoorn 2001: 82). A more recent contribution suggests that embedded 
neoliberalism is undergoing a crisis as the passive (or permissive) consensus to 
this project is waning (van Apeldoorn 2009: 38).   
 
This way of understanding hegemony as an embedded project is useful, 
but there are two problematic issues. First, like the other Gramscian approaches, 
it tends to over-emphasise the power of transnational class or capital interests, 
using these to define political and economic dynamics respectively. Second, its 
choice of terms again suggests that neoliberal transnational capital is the key 
determining factor, something that underestimates the role of the domestic. For ǡǮǯe of whether transnational capital 
needs a context in which to operate. Rather, the very context itself (the EU) is a 
source of rival hegemonic projects.  The embedding that van Apeldoorn refers to 
in relation to European integration is actually a compromise between 
neoliberalism, neo-mercantilism and other social and political projects: 
something that this article is keen to underline. Indeed, we can identify tensions 
within the neo-
ǡǡǯ
identification Ǯtransnationally ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ
219) and ǯ view, with which we agree, that neo-Gramscian scholars 
tend to under-estimate local autonomy and overstate the extent that local elites 
are dependent on external projects (2009: 194). In Cafruny we find something of 
a compromise position that claims monetary union is indicative of Ǯǯǡ
domestic strategies, social settlements and political calculations (2003: 287). 
 
We label our approach critical integration theory for two main reasons. 
First, critical implies scepticism towards the competing mainstream views of 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism as well as reservations about 
contemporary developments such as new intergovernmentalism. Second, the 
integration component draws attention to the specificities of integration itself, 
rather than reading off integration as an effect of some other process or dynamic. 
Instead, and in line with critical realism, we see it as an emergent social feature 
composed of complex and often contradictory dynamics. In this article, our 
argument for a critical integration theory draws particular attention to a) Ȃ the 
multilevel character of integration with particular emphasis on specific national 
and domestic dynamics; b) Ȃ the contestation between distinct political and 
economic dynamics which exist in complex inter-relationship and often tension. 
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In contrast to functionalist, rationalist and unitary stances of rival theories, we 
place emphasis on a relational understanding of the integration process that 
starts from the bottom-up. This will be explored through a focus on hegemonic 
projects. 
 
Bringing the structure-agency relationship in 
As a key step in developing our argument about integration as a hegemonic 
project, we wish to emphasise the importance of the structure-agency debate for 
EU studies. In essence this debate focuses on the relationship between political 
actors and the environment within which they operate, putting actors/agents in 
context. It allows an assessment of the possibilities and limitations of various 
actions including political projects.  
 
The structure-agency debate has not had the same impact in EU studies as 
in IR where it has played a significant role (Wendt 1987, Dessler 1989, Wight 
2006, Joseph 2008). This is perhaps best explained by the dominance of 
constructivism as the main challenger to functionalist and rationalist views in EU 
studies. Consequently, a structurationist perspective, drawn from the work of 
Anthony Giddens and adopted by Alexander Wendt in IR (Giddens 1984, Wendt 
1987), ǤǮǯ
perspective conflates structure and agency, thus making it difficult to determine 
different aspects of the integration process or to draw attention to the distinct 
properties or causal effects of different elements in this process.  
 
By contrast, we adopt a critical realist argument in order to disaggregate 
structure and agency, thereby putting agents in their appropriate social context. 
This approach posits that structures and agents are distinct from one another: 
they have different properties, powers and liabilities. Social structures are 
relatively enduring and pre-exist the agents who act upon them. Hence they have 
anteriority and enable and constrain those agents acting within them. Despite 
this conditioning agents possess their own irreducible powers, notably 
intentionality, reflexivity and consciousness (see Carter and New 2004). While 
they may not choose the conditions in which they act, agents possess, to greater 
or lesser degrees, an awareness of these conditions and an ability to act upon 
them. It is through such actions that social structures are reproduced and 
occasionally transformed.  The latter process of transformation, or indeed 
conservation, requires intentional action, notably through the development of 
hegemonic projects that reflect particular interests and identities. Such projects, 
therefore, are developed in the context of social structures but the structural 
properties of enablement and constraint combine with the agential powers of 
action and purpose to produce (transformations in) outcomes.  
 
In opposing the conflation of structure and agency this position means 
that there are gaps in both consciousness and time insofar as the constitutive 
role of structures predates the occupants of positions within them, thus 
requiring a distinction between the social conditions necessary for agency, the 
conscious acts of these agents, and the reproduced outcomes of such acts 
(Archer 1995: 106). The conditioning power of structures may therefore exert a 
strong influence over agents in shaping both actions and awareness while, given 
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this context, conscious actions may have unconscious or unintended 
consequences or structural outcomes. Indeed, it is particularly important that 
political analysis identifies that actors are usually only partially aware of the 
context in which they act and that certain actions might have unconscious or 
unintended consequences due to the influence of different structural factors.  
 
European integration involves conscious agency, whilst allowing that 
there may be many uncontrollable or unintended outcomes and effects. This in 
turn enables us to talk of the complexity of various processes without having to 
resort to either the functionalist argument that these processes have their own 
dynamics or logic, or the instrumentalist view that outcomes are purely the 
result of conscious interests or actions. A concrete illustration of this point would ǯ single market 
unleashed a range of dynamics in the mid-1980s, such as strengthening EU social 
and monetary policies that were not the intended consequences of its initiative. 
Indeed, the dynamics set in train are also at the root of many of the internal 
dǯǤǡ
political choices taken in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty provisions on 
EMU, and augmented by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, left an incomplete 
design with unintended consequences. EU leaders, finance ministers and others 
have been tackling them ever since the Eurozone crisis developed in 2010 (see 
Copsey 2015, Chapter 1).  
 
Thus our position on the structure-agency relationship avoids ǯg the two. The continuous interplay of Ǯǯof political actors and the structural context is a vital 
characteristic of the contestation between hegemonic projects in the EU. It helps 
explain ǯ: for instance in 2015, as newly elected 
governments (SYRIZA in Greece or Cameron in the UK) sought to challenge 
current policy structures; or a new wave of external refugees challenged the 
existing EU migration regime. 
 ǮǯǤ	ǡis the EU institutional 
frameworkȄǯinstitutional architecture, policy competences and the 
acquis communautaireȄǯǤ
institutional framework amounts, at any one time, to the instantiation or 
outcome of struggles driven by various economic and political dynamics. The 
institutional framework, it must be noted, is characterised by multi-level 
governance (MLG) The EU is thus part of the proliferation of various forms of 
governance operating beyond the traditional practices of (national) 
governments. MLG highlights the multiple scales and complex, fluid and 
overlapping jurisdictions of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 15-6; Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1996; Bache and Flinders 2004). MLG also permits 
understanding of the de-nationalization of statehood, the de-statization of 
politics, and the re-articulation of territorial and functional powers (Jessop 2004: 
61). It also captures the idea of the EU institutional structure as an emergent but 
not fully realised sphere of governance. The structure-agency debate helps us 
understand this form of instantiation by drawing attention to both structural and 
agential aspects of European integration.  
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While much attention has been paid to the relationship between agents, 
institutions and norms Ȃ particularly in meso-level approaches influenced by 
constructivism and historical institutionalism Ȃ we wish to also emphasise, 
secondly, the macro-structural features understood as underlying causes and ǯǤ
features include the global economy, the financial crisis, neoliberal attempts at 
restructuring social relations, the geo-political and strategic context relating to 
the post-Cold War order such as the shifting USȂEU relationship, new 
securitisation processes, the changing role of the state, changing state-society 
relations, the shift to new forms of governance, developments within civil society 
and demographic changes. 
 
These underlying macro-structural features necessitate agency in order 
to mobilise for integration. Agency is not located exclusively at the domestic level 
because supranational institutions such as the Commission can also exercise it. 
And transnational actors can seek to pursue their projects at this level (see van 
Apeldoorn 2000 on the European Round Table of Industrialists). However, its 
social embeddedness means that agency is much more strongly grounded at the 
domestic level, comprising the member state governments plus the social, 
economic and political forces organised at national and subnational levels within 
the states. The key point is that we see this way of looking at things as enabling 
domestic politics and social relations to be brought in without limiting the 
account to national governments forming the umbilical cord between EU 
institutions and domestic interests in the way that (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism does.  
 
Moreover, we argue that domestic actors are not only driven by economic 
motivations and geopolitics, as per LI. Nor are they only capable of interpretation 
through instrumental rationality, as per LI. Similarly, they are not just driven by 
transnational capital and class struggle according to some neo-Gramscian 
interpretations. ǣǮǯ
advocated by Bavaria, or a repatriation of EU competences, as advocated from 
some quarters in Britain. And they may arise from popular interventions, such as 
adverse referendum votes on treaty reform, from Euro-scepticism that typically 
has political roots, or from domestic political resistance to integration (see 
McCauley 2011), including political opposition to the consequences of the 
Eurozone crisis. In short, domestic actors may just as easily be Euro-sceptic Ǯǯ-level advocates of integration 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). In this way we explicitly connect integration to 
underlying domestic politics, whereas neofunctionalism and LI, as competing 
elitist explanations, make more limited connections. 
 
The relationship of actors to the EU is complex because of the number of 
different levels of governance and their different configuration across policy 
areas. Different interests across the EU shape integration. Institutional fixes must 
be achieved at supranational as well as the national or subnational levels. There 
may be conflicts between the different levels and conflicts will also exist within 
national and regional blocs over orientation to the EU. The complexity of the 
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terrain means that it is often far from evident exactly what the consequences will 
be for particular actions and agreements and the consequences of a fix at one 
level may only be revealed over time as the full socio-institutional consequences 
unfold. The fluidity of the EU, in particular in relation to its political form, is the 
product of these complex relationships, while the structure retains continuity 
because of the path-dependence and incrementalism explained by historical 
institutionalists such as Paul Pierson (1996). 
 
Hence we conceive of integration as a three-way relationship between 
underlying macro-structural conditions, agency and institutional framework 
where each impacts on the integration process producing outcomes that can only 
be understood in historical context. The institutions of the EU are caught 
between macro-structural and agential pressures. Macro-structural influences 
may exert pressure to change the EU institutional framework, perhaps leading to 
change despite conscious agential efforts to prevent or avoid this. Agents may 
seek to shape the integration process in accordance with wider structural 
changes such as developments in the global economy or the general trend 
towards new forms of governance. But agents may also seek to resist these 
changes and may develop policies that are at odds with the general underlying 
conditions. The institutional element is particularly interesting because, as both 
institutionalists (e.g.  DiMaggio and Powell 1983), constructivists (e.g. Barnett 	 ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯȋ
Pouliot 2011) have noted, institutions and bureaucracies develop their own 
administrative dynamics that are irreducible either to the agents involved or the 
structures they interact with. These dynamics can be understand in terms of 
isomorphism, path dependencies and the significance of historical legacies. The 
requirement of unanimity on treaty reforms and the convention of seeking to 
achieve consensus between member governments on major EU-wide policy 
decisions support path-dependency when agential efforts may favour change. 
 
 We now move to fit hegemony into the structure-agency picture which 
means looking at the conditions, opportunities and possibilities for social agents 
to construct political projects. In particular, we take the view that hegemony 
represents the mediating point between structure and agency, providing the 
strategic element that explains why particular things develop in certain times 
and places. Hegemony is also particularly useful in relating to institutions and 
the process of embedding strategic responses to macro level issues. A complex of 
structures Ȃ political, economic and cultural Ȃ provides the context for actors to 
develop or pursue their own interests, but this also sets limits and points the 
projects in a certain direction. Gramsci captured this idea through his argument 
that hegemony is not simply the relation of one group over another, but the 
relation between these groups and their social conditions (Gramsci 1971: 49). 
Hence we are concerned to avoid both the individualist approach to agency as 
embodied in liberal intergovernmentalism, the functionalism and teleology of 
neofunctionalism and the reductionist approach of those Marxist scholars who 
reduce the effects of macro structures to questions of capital or class. The main 
ǯ
political projects simply reflect socio-Ǯǯ
of capitalist production. Drawing from critical realism, we advocate an 
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Ǯǯ
can be read off from dominant economic conditions even if these exert a 
powerful influence over the political agenda. Indeed, hegemony both recognises 
and problematizes these conditions, particularly in relation to the economy. 
While a successful hegemonic project must try and root itself in the Ǯdecisive 
nucleus of economic activityǯȋ
 ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍ, it must also relate to broader 
issues of social cohesion Ȃ something that is particularly hard to achieve at the 
European level. We therefore develop this understanding of the concept of 
hegemony in order to draw attention to the distinctive social, political and 
economic interests that integration needs to reconcile.  
 
European Integration as a hegemonic project?  
We take a hegemonic project to refer to attempts to mobilise support in favour of 
a far-reaching programme of action. This is based on the interests of the leading 
group (for Gramsci it would be the dominant class fraction), but which seeks to 
incorporate other groups and fractions while attempting to resolve conflicts 
between particular interests and a more general interest. This exercising of 
leadership and balancing of interests cannot be confined to the economic sphere, 
however important this may be, but is exercised on the terrain of politics, civil 
society and the state. In terms of scale, therefore, a hegemonic project goes 
beyond more narrowly defined political projects, policy agendas or economic 
objectives particularly insofar as it impacts, according to our earlier 
understanding, on the relationship between structures, institutions and agents. 
  
European integration can be seen as a weak hegemonic project, made up 
of many sub interests and compromises between rival interests. It requires a 
great deal of institutional fixes and historical compromises at key moments and, 
because of its fragile and contested nature, is particularly subject to unintended 
consequences. More precisely, we regard European integration not as a single 
coherent project, but as the outcome of competing projects. In contrast to the 
neo-
ǯǡ
these projects as driven by a variety of political interests and economic motives 
operating at different levels. Some have a more domestic character, others are 
driven by more global motivations whether this be some kind of neoliberal 
project, or a particular political vision of Europe. In confining our analysis to 
competing political and economic dynamics, we note that this is a potential 
simplification. Buckel (2011), for instance, explores whether the European Court ǮǯǤ 
 
Two things are of key importance: recognising the contestation between 
projects with different political and economic motivations; and the importance 
of member state-EU relations and MLG to this contestation. Hegemonic projects 
are easier to mobilise within member states than at EU level because there is a 
relatively weak sense of European social or economic relations. This observation 
reflects the limitations of the EU ǮǯǡǮǯǡ
supranational level. Hence the struggles in relation to different political and 
economic dynamics are predominantly driven by competing views originating 
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from the member states, incorporating wider domestic political and social 
contexts than merely the views of member governments.  
 
Our first step is to distinguish between hegemony and hegemonic 
projects. Hegemony might be said to describe a relatively stable or stabilised 
condition where there is some kind of unity between different processes, Ǥ
ǮǯǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍ
into their social context. It is difficult to see European integration as a successful 
form of hegemony because of the dynamic tensions that exist between different 
processes, levels and interests and, not least, its fluidity over time in terms of 
competences (treaty reform) and boundaries (because of both enlargement and 
differentiated integration). It is easier to see European integration as a complex 
process caught between economic and political tensions, some projects having 
more of an economic character, others with a more explicitly political nature. In 
making this distinction we recognise they are interlinked and in constant 
dynamic tension.  
 
Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek consider insertion into the world market as 
one factor in determining the success of a hegemonic project alongside the 
composition of the bloc, class forces and path dependencies or historical legacies 
of institutions and structures (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek 2012: 9) This 
perspective regards neoliberalism as a project in constant motion that is 
required to engage with existing path dependencies and counter-strategies in a 
constant process of struggle, contestation and renegotiation (2012: 7). The fact 
that such a project needs to mobilize people and gain consent makes its success ǡǯǤ
Neoliberal European governance can therefore be said to be a project but not 
necessarily a hegemonic one given its need to engage with and adapt to different 
European populations, institutions and traditions (van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil 
and Horn 2009: 12). These political tensions are drawn out by Hermann and 
Hofbauer (2007), who stress the importance of the European Social Model as an 
alternative to the US neoliberal model. Placing emphasis on the political domain 
in line with our aim, they argue that this social democratic vision of a unified 
Europe is clearly an approach that holds social and political programmes to be 
equally important, even if now overshadowed by free market alternatives 
(Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 127). Importantly, such an argument draws 
attention to the fact that European projects are required to present a vision with 
which wider forces can identify, something that neoliberalism has clearly failed 
to achieve in the political sense, despite its economic advances. Hegemony is 
important in pointing to the need for this wider support, and to the perils of 
advancing European projects that clearly lack it. 
 
Our second step comes as a consequence of recognising that EU 
integration is not itself a successful form of hegemony and certainly not the 
result of some kind of unified project or vision. Rather, it is better to see 
integration as the outcome of various projects that compete across the political 
and economic terrain. The shape of the institutional architecture, policy 
competences and the acquis communautaire is punctuated by moments of 
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historic compromise between these competing interests. It might be tempting, 
particularly for neo-Gramscian analysis (e.g. Bieler and Morton 2001), to 
conclude that the integration process has been captured by a coherent neoliberal 
project driven by transnational capital. Yet, even if we limit analysis to economic 
issues, we can see competing economic interests that confront the neoliberal 
focus on financialisation and unrestricted capital mobility (as has been revealed ȌǤǡ
ǡǯ
economy, the powerful interests of industrial capital and a big home market 
(neo-mercantalism) and a rules-based approach to economic management 
(ordoliberalism) force the neoliberal finance-driven project into compromise. 
Across the EU we find a lot more diversity than within individual member states. 
In some states there are still powerful organised labour interests, corporatist, 
statist or solidaristic tendencies. So European integration is not only multi-
layered but also pluralistic, reflecting tensions between economic and political 
interests rather than a coherent neoliberal project. Critical integration theory 
recognises the primacy of these tensions, rather than reading them off as the 
secondary consequence of functional, instrumental or capital logics. 
 
When we look at political dynamics we see that there are clearly different 
political projects that cannot be reduced to and may contradict the idea of a 
single economic logic. Indeed some of the political projects that continue to exist 
today predate the current neoliberal agenda by decades. These older projects 
draw their legitimacy from a very different vision of Europe and continue to 
motivate a set of political interests that often stand in the way of a neoliberal Ǥǯnism vis-à-vis lower cost 
global food producers is a case in point. 
 
It is decidedly anti-Gramscian to see the integration process as reflecting 
a clear neoliberal agenda representing only the economic strand, thus 
downplaying the role of politics, ignoring the causal power of alternative visions 
of Europe and undermining the idea that such projects are contested. Nor does it 
create adequate space for the role of governance, which, if anything, may well be 
a more valuable way to understand neoliberalism. If neoliberalism is viewed less 
as a homogenous economic doctrine and more as a particular form of 
governance that rules through an appeal to the discipline of the market, then it is 
open to challenge from alternative approaches to economic governance in the 
EU, particularly the French tradition of dirigisme and, more importantly, the 
German ordoliberal approach that has been influential in the search for solutions 
to the Eurozone crisis (Bulmer 2014, Ryner 2015). 
 
 ǯitical economy is open to 
challenge, the political leitmotif is equally contested. Political contestation has 
been in progress since the French Schuman Plan proposed joint (supranational) 
control over coal and steel as a way to assure Franco-German peace. The 
supranational pre-requisite excluded the participation of Britain, whose faith in 
the nation state had been maintained during World War Two. The long-standing 
debate as to whether the EU should be supranational or intergovernmental in 
character continues. Each round of constitutional reform or institutional 
settlement has been of great importance because it has represented an 
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embedded compromise arising from this struggle. However, it has also provided 
an arena of ongoing contestation until the next settlement. Advocates of 
supranationalism welcomed the enhancement of decision-making powers for the ȋȌǤǯǯ
though thǯǤȄǮǯǮǯ
process (Christiansen and Jørgensen 1999)Ȅreflects the way in which the ǯnda from 2010 onwards, and the way 
in which government heads have played such an important role in rescue 
measures, rectifying design faults in monetary union and so on.  
  
 There have been, smaller-scale areas of contestation as well: on whether 
policies should be interventionist, like the original Common Agricultural Policy, 
or more market oriented. Sub-plots exist, for instance in relation to the balance 
within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy between ensuring 
internal security and protecting liberties, or on the spread of powers across 
levels of government in debates on subsidiarity. 
 
These forms of political contestation have been well captured by 
Jachtenfuchs et. al. (1998) in their examination of the conflicting models of a 
legitimate European order (abbreviated to polity-ideas). Similarly, Marcussen et. 
al. (1999) explored the inter-relationship between national identity and the 
integration project in France, Germany and the UK. Their explanations are 
grounded in, respectively, normative-discursive and identity-based 
interpretations. Like constructivist accounts, they discuss contesting views 
among actors, but struggle to account for the reasons behind such contestation 
and change. It is telling that Waever is forced to move beyond a discursive 
approach in suggesting that change and re-articulations are produced through 
adjusting to changing internal positions like the growth in power of certain 
groups, or in response to external conditions like the momentum of the EU in the 
1990s (Waever 2002: 39).  
 
Having looked at the multiplicity of interests and the usefulness of an 
approach that recognises separate political and economic dynamics in complex 
interaction, we now put this into the context of MLG. Taking a multi-layered 
approach to hegemony means recognizing the specificity of different projects 
operating at national and subnational levels and examining how these engage 
with the supranational level and respond to it in positive and negative ways. The 
fluidity of contestation was demonstrated during the Scottish independence 
referendum, with the different values and indeed attitudes to the EU on display 
compared to England. While hegemonic projects at the national and subnational 
levels are stronger and easier to develop, the result may be contradictory and 
conflicting projects across the EU. Thus integration is best seen in terms of 
hegemonic contestation rather than as coherent and unified strategies. This 
position is consistent with a view of the EU as both a site of governance and a 
terrain for the unfolding of various projects. This argument will be illustrated in 
the final section. 
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For now, two significant points can be identified in relation to the drivers of 
integration. We wish to emphasise: 
Ɣ the significance of the domestic as reflected in different political 
strategies, settlements and calculations. Interests are more strongly 
grounded at the domestic level as are mechanisms of articulation and 
legitimation.  
Ɣ integration is driven by elites, but these ought not be reduced to 
different class or capital fractions. To do so ignores the specific 
political and institutional interests of such groups. Moreover, the ǮǯǮǯǡ
significance of our first point about domestic politics. This has been 
manifested in different ways during moments of crisis of integration Ǯǯ (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
 
Corresponding to specific political and economic changes, we make the 
general claim that the complex processes of rescaling in European integration 
can be linked to two intersecting dynamics, namely:  
Ɣ the changing political forms of rule and the general shift from 
government to governance and simultaneous devolution of state 
powers downwards and internationalization of policy upwards, 
including in non-economic areas such as the Common Security and 
Defence Policy and AFSJ; and 
Ɣ general economic changes towards greater interdependence and 
intensification of economic flows, increasing financialisation and 
shifting ways of regulating markets and a drive to market 
liberalization but conditioned by the rules-based ordoliberal approach 
to EU monetary and fiscal policy and attempts to protect social 
provision: all of which are reflected in the integration project.  
 
Despite the significant political and economic divisions already 
mentioned, these trends have a general resonance across the member states. But 
the multilayered character of EU governance means that even though the 
economic project has a strongly supranational centripetal character, its 
dependence on implementation by member states introduces centrifugal Ǥ
ǯǮǯǡ
triggering of the Eurozone crisis is sufficient illustration. Thus, as van Apeldoorn 
has noted (2009: 22), whilst ǯ
economic liberalisation may be relatively supranational, implementation is the 
responsibility of nation states, and in each case depends on the relative 
embeddedness of this project in national institutions.  
 
The need to nationally embed a supranational project raises two 
significant challenges that the notion of hegemony is particularly good at 
highlighting: coordinating hegemony across scales; and reconciling the different 
political forms that national hegemony takes. It would be normal, therefore, to 
expect somewhat different projects to exist across the different levels, each with 
their own political and economic priorities. While this does not make a 
supranational project impossible, it makes it more difficult to achieve (through 
reconciling different national interests) and to maintain (across the different 
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levels). The existence of different projects at different levels means that 
supranational projects are emergent insofar as they are dependent on but not 
reducible to certain fundamental social relations and interests (see Ferrera 
2014: 227-30).  Ǯǯonalist notion 
that what goes on at national and local levels might simply be read off from some ǤǮǯǤ
social relations than national projects, thus making it much more fragile when 
fair weather conditions end, such as has been the case following the financial 
crisis and, more specifically, for the debtor states in the Eurozone crisis. 
 
From abstraction to empirical interpretation  
In this section we seek to offer illustration of how our critical integration theory 
can shed new light on the current crisis in the EU. We follow our conception of 
integration as a three-way relationship between underlying macro-structural 
conditions, agency and EU institutions. Agency is most strongly rooted in the 
member states, reinforcing the important role of domestic politics in integration. 
By understanding the state of integration as the outcome of trying to balance 
contested hegemonic projects, we seek to go beyond the rival elitist 
interpretations of integration offered by neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
 
 European integration in the post-Maastricht period has been 
characterised by a number of key features:  
x the increased role of government heads in the steering of the overall 
process and of individual component parts, such as EMU, foreign policy 
and Justice and Home Affairs (a stronger intergovernmental process on 
strategic decisions); 
x increasingly supranational integration outcomes, since additional policy 
areas such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, banking regulation, home 
affairs and energy securityȄto list some illustrationsȄhave been 
partially or wholly transferred into ǯǡȋ
supranational outcomes); 
x the growth of differentiated integration as a pattern of institutional fixes 
that permits a strengthened integration outcome for some member states, 
such as those in the Eurozone or the passport-free Schengen zone (hard 
intergovernmental bargaining resulting in more supranational outcomes 
only for insiders); and  
x the increased penetration of politics at the supranational level by 
domestic political considerations: from referendum rejections of treaty 
reform through to protest on the streets in relation to Eurozone austerity 
policies (challenging the elitist assumptions of both neo-functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism).  
Our conclusion is that it is necessary to look beyond the traditional theoretical ǯurrent challenges. 
 
 ǯ
plight. It derived from a crisis in public finances in some states, notably Greece 
and by contagion Portugal, and from a banking crisis in others, e.g. Ireland and 
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Spain. When the crisis broke it led to recognition that the design of EMU was 
unbalanced because of the lack of fiscal powers to match those for monetary 
policy. Whilst the acute phase may have passedȄalthough Greece remains on 
the critical listȄa chronic problem of weak economic growth persists.  
 
 The crisis is also political in character. A deep-seated, slow-moving 
political crisis of integration has arisen from the decline in public support for 
integration. Reflected in several rejections by referendum of EU treaties, it found 
particular expression in the May 2014 EP elections, when the advance of Euro-
scepticism was especially noticeable even if in several variants of populism. The 
UK Independence Party topped the share of the vote in Britain; the 5 Star 
Movement came second in Italy. The right-wing Front National topped the polls 
in France. The European Conservatives and Reformists Group, the third largest 
in the EP, represents a softer form of Euro-scepticism, led by British 
Conservatives. Polls in Greece were topped by SYRIZA, in government and 
offering a critique of Eurozone orthodoxy from the left. Whilst these groups may 
be divided in the EP, and their underlying political significance might have been Ǯ-ǯelection, Euro-scepticism has 
taken root in many EU member states. Its precise form varies from one member 
state to another but in the UK case its electoral and parliamentary potency at ǯtish 
membership prior to a referendum. Their majority in the May 2015 election 
therefore placed ǯǤ 
 
 We explain post-Maastricht politics, and the continued manifestation of 
its characteristics during the Eurozone crisis, through conflicting hegemonic 
projects that are rooted in and legitimated through domestic politics. We can 
identify at least four projects that have shaped integration over recent decades 
(using the terms deployed in neo-Gramscian analysis by Buckel 2014: 643-4; see 
also Kannankulam 2013ǢǮ-ideasǯ in 
Jachtenfuchs et. al. 1998). Arguably dominant  is a neoliberal hegemonic project 
that has seen its advocates (certain governments plus business interests) 
pushing for an EU that can be competitive in a global trading and production 
setting, pushing for liberalisation in the single market, EU external trade policy 
and seeking to limit the EU regulatory burden. A second project can be identified 
as a national-social hegemonic project. The primary motivation of its centre-left 
and trade union advocates has been the preservation of strong social systems at 
member-state level, assured through maintaining a more interventionist nation-
state role to facilitate domestic redistributive outcomes. Thirdly, a national-
conservative hegemonic project brings together political forces resisting further 
integration, and supported by members of society who have lost out from 
globalisation, resist cosmopolitanism and typically also immigration. Fourthly, a 
pro-European social democratic hegemonic project, though much weakened in ǡǮǯǤǮǯǡ
during the presidency of Jacques Delors, and the EP for further integrative steps 
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to secure market-correcting measures at a supranational level.2 The projects 
should be understood heuristically as simplifications or broad contours of more 
complex and nuanced contestation. This is especially the case when exploring 
the Eurozone crisis (below), since the discrete thinking of ordoliberalism offers 
valuable insights into policy solutions that were advocated. 
 
 The Maastricht Treaty secured a historic compromise between these 
projects, as manifested in the context of the special circumstances of the end of 
the Cold War and German re-unification. ǡǮǯ
June 1992 and the need for opt-outs to accommodate specific requirements on 
EMU (Denmark and the UK) and social regulation (UK) were indicative of the 
increasing way in which domestic politics were directly penetrating EU level 
compromises in ways that necessitated new types of institutional fixes, namely 
differentiated integration. Maintaining this compromise has proved very 
challenging in the post-Maastricht period.  
 
 Whilst it is possible to see domestic politicsȄlike European integration 
itselfȄas the product of transnational capitalism (see Drahokoupil 2009; van 
Apeldoorn 2009), we depart from that position which has been encapsulated by ǤǮǥ cannot be understood as completely internally 
determined. I argue that it must be treated as an instantiation of locally 
materializing transnational processesǯȋokoupil 2009: 190). We argue that 
there is more to the current crisis in the EU, and its manifestation in the domestic 
politics of the member states, ǮǯǤ  
 
 In order to make this argument in the wider context of competing ǡǤ
ǯ
role in the Eurozone crisis, since its prominent role has led to suggestions, even 
by the Luxembourg foreign minister (Rinke 2013), that it is pursuing a 
hegemonic project of its own (see also Bulmer 2014). As a contrast, we explore 
the background to the British ǯ
negotiate a new deal with its EU partners and put it to a referendum on 
continued membership. Here the focus is on a state that has become caught 
between two rival hegemonic projects that are associated with major domestic 
political fault-ǯ
lead to an exit. 
 
 The original Maastricht design of European Monetary Union (EMU) was 
strongly influenced by Germany (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). It 
institutionalised the Bundesbank model of price stability and central banking. It 
placed the burden of economic adjustment on other states. It insisted on the 
inclusion of a Ǯ-ǯ
financing oǯǤ It pressed for the continued 
surveillance of fiscal discipline via the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). All this 
                                                        
2 ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǮ-liberal-alternative hegemonic ǯo-environmental and pro-human rights groups with the third wave of ǯǤ
this amounts to a coherent hegemonic project, so omit it from discussion here. 
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was done with a very small budget for fiscal transfers via the EU cohesion 
funding and with no budgetary provision at all for macroeconomic stabilisation. 
Krotz and Schild (2013: 185) summarise the German position as reflecting a Ǯse European rules and 
ǯǤ  
 
 The German position on the EMU design was driven by the wish to assure 
neighbours that its unification in the new post-Cold War world would not be a 
threat to peace but, rather, would be accompanied by a deepening of 
supranational integration. At the same time EMU would facilitate the continuing 
economic integration of the EU (following the single market), thereby bringing 
benefits to a major exporting state. The design of the rules conformed to the 
ordoliberal economic model that had served Germany so well in the postwar 
period and was admired by a group of fellow member states. The export of a 
German rules-based model to the EU also allayed concerns of the German public, 
which was anxious about giving up the Deutsche Mark, one of its major symbols 
of identity. We should note here that the German position was itself the synthesis 
of different hegemonic projects: the neoliberal one of market-making; a political 
one of transcending the nation state as part of assuring European peace; and an 
ordoliberal one (on which see Bonefeld 2012) that reflected the distinctive rules-
based system rooted in a German tradition, in which the state plays an active 
role in assuring functioning markets. At Ǯǯ
included strengthening cooperation in foreign policy and justice and home 
affairs, plus an increase in intra-EU financial transfers agreed at the Edinburgh 
European Council in December 1992. 
 
 The first signs of the Eurozone crisis emerged at the end of 2009, on the 
heels of the global financial crisis. Events in Greece accelerated Eurozone 
governments towards a rescue agreed in May 2010, and eventually led on to 
further rescues of Ireland, Portugal, Greece again, Spain and Cyprus. As the 
largest Eurozone state, the leading creditor state and the architect of the EMU 
design, the decision to preserve the achievements of the Eurozone structure gave 
Germany significant leverage in determining the necessary reforms to rescue the 
system. Again they came with a strong ordoliberal flavour: debtor states had to ǮǯǢǢ
banking union was needed to break the link between sovereigns and banks; and 
rescue funds would be needed to provide a firewall and limit contagion. By force 
of circumstances Germany was able to shape the rescue of EMU in many 
respects.  
 
 Emblematic of the ordoliberal prescription was the Fiscal Compact, 
signed in March 2012, which comprised a balanced budget rule (like one 
Germany had introduced in 2009); a debt-brake rule; an automatic correction 
mechanism if these rules are not complied with; and the requirement of the 
states to give these rules at least at the status of law. We note in passing that the 
Fiscal Compact had to be agreed under international law because the UK and the 
Czech Republic refused to sign: an indication of how the UK government rejected 
ordoliberal rules that might constrain its neoliberal concerns on behalf of the 
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City of London and the national-conservative/Eurosceptic sentiment on the part 
of public opinion, the print media and key parliamentary backbenchers. 
 
 So, how does the rescue of the Eurozone tie in with our understanding of 
integration as the outcome of conflict between competing hegemonic projects? It ǡǡǮcontradictions and 
limits of the neoliberal European project as constructed over the past few 
decadesǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
of European integration, where deeper fiscal and banking integration has 
ensued. Is it, therefore, a largely unmediated triumph of an ordoliberal project, 
driven on by Germany? Such a conclusion would be too simplistic.  
 
 First, it needs to be recalled that the European Central Bank (ECB) can 
take considerable credit for facilitating the rescue of the system: through ǯ ? ? ? ?Ǯǯǯ ? ? ? ?Ǥ
incurred the wrath of the President of the German Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, 
who regarded them as a betrayal of the (German) rules institutionalized in the 
European Central Bank Statute (Die Welt 2015). Secondly, Germany was a Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǯ
of feckless southern Europeans receiving support from German taxpayers. It had 
to take account of party politics, since in six of nine roll-call votes in the 
Bundestag between September 2010 and November 2011 the centre-right 
coalition was unable to secure a majority for approving key Eurozone decisions 
without support from opposition Social Democrats and Greens. The rise of an 
anti-Euro party (Alternative for Germany) later in the crisis introduced further 
domestic concern. Moreover, the Federal Constitutional CourtȄa defender of 
national democracy via the BundestagȄmade several key judgments on which 
the financial markets and potentially the fate of the Eurozone have depended. 
Domestic politics mattered! As a final observation it must be noted that debate 
within the ordǮǯȋ
Jacoby 2014) has prevailed over any democratic socialist hegemonic project, 
since the influence of French President Hollande, Italian Prime Minister Renzi 
not to mention Greek Prime Minister Tsipras has been very limited on the 
integration outcome. 
 
 
ǯǯ
politicisation of European policy. Politicisation has been longstanding in the UK. 
For instance, the Labour Party, in opposition in the early-1980s, adopted a policy 
of supporting withdrawal from the EU but later moved from defending a Ǯ-ǯ
Blair with a European social project, as reflected in signing the Social Chapter in 
1997, as well as endorsement of the Thatcherite legacy of neoliberalism.  
 
 ǯ
efforts can be attributed to the legacy of Thatcherism. Her advocacy of the single 
maǯ
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neoliberal hegemonic project at EU level, albeit combined with other contrasting 
measures in the 1986 Single European Act. Commission President Jacques Delors 
built on this momentum to pursue a European social-democratic project 
entailing EU-level social regulation and monetary union. This development 
caused a major fracture in the Conservative Party, reflecting Prime Minister ǯǡor whom primacy was 
on defending national sovereignty and those supporting a neoliberal project via 
the EU (Ludlam 1998). This conflict has not been resolved and has been ǯǡ
with 12.6 per cent of the vote in the 2015 General Election. How the negotiations, 
their impact on EU integration, never mind the outcome of the UK referendum, 
all play out, remains to be seen. However, the key point here is that conflict 
between competing hegemonic projects at EU level is immediately evident 
within the UK. 
 
 These two illustrations, we argue, reveal how contestation amongst 
different projects is rooted in domestic politics. The projects are dynamised by 
responses to macro-structural change: geo-political, such as the end of the Cold 
War; economic, such as globalisation and financialisation; and others. 
Domestically, the projects are no longer the preserve of economic and political 
elites, as the 2014 European Parliament elections or southern European protests 
against austerity reveal. How they are resolved at EU level produces an outcome 
in terms of integration that may be the transfer of more powers to the EU, 
intergovernmental obstruction to further transfer of powers, or increased 
differentiation within the EU due to complex institutional fixes to accommodate ǯǤ
issues in terms of mainstream integration theories downplays the substantive 
political and economic struggles and the role of domestic politics in favour of 
competing elitist accounts of institutional outcomes (intergovernmentalism or 
supranationalism).  
 
The focus on the struggle for hegemony grounds our analysis in a range of 
discursive and non-discursive practices and the wider structural context within 
which these exist. Thus we have sought to widen our empirical range of analysis 
beyond the normative and identitive roots typically associated with Ǯǯ-Gramscian 
account rooted in transnational capital. Instead we have sought to show, via 
these vignettes, that a Gramscian focus on competing hegemonic projects can 
offer insights into the compromises reached, the means by which they are 
achieved, and the wider macro social context which enables and constrains them. 
However, these compromises go beyond the confines of neo-Gramscian political 
economy, which tends to neglect the immediate political and institutional sites of 
struggle in favour of interpretations of EU outcomes as the product of deep-
seated developments in transnational capital and their manifestations in class 
struggle. 
 
Conclusion  
The study of European integration was memorably encapsulated by Donald 
Puchala (1971) as like blind men (sic) studying an elephant. Accordingly, 
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different integration theorists were feeling different parts of the elephant but not 
seeing the whole. In this paper we have sought to identify some of the 
shortcomings of mainstream integrationist approaches and existing neo-
Ǯǯǡ
particularly in light of the challenges presented in the post-Lisbon period.  
 
 In developing a critical integration theory, we have sought to embrace Ǯǯ
bring power and political economy into greater prominence. Our objective has 
been to revive and advance general theory on integration and to buck the trend 
towards research on ever narrower agendas. We believe our approach entails no 
teleological bias and can therefore accommodate both deeper integration or 
disintegration (that is, a decline in the number of EU policy areas or member 
states or the inability of the EU to put policy into practice owing to the resistance 
of individual states: see Webber 2014: 342). The emphasis on brokering 
compromises between projects can also explain an area of integration theory 
neglected in other general theory: the institutional fixes that are intrinsic to 
differentiated integration. We consider our theoretical perspective to offer a 
greater sense of realism, while offering dialogue between different traditions. 
 
 By building on recent theorising of the structure-agency relationship we 
have been able to integrate agency, institutional structure and macro social 
structures into the account. We have set out how integration outcomes can be 
both intended and unintended, since the latter are a recurrent feature of the EU. 
A further component to critical integration theorǮǯǤ-project made up of sub-projects 
largely rooted at the domestic level. Thus, when something goes wrong or ǮǯǡǤ
Consequently, integration is the shifting outcomeȄǯ
changing membership, policy repertoire and institutional orderȄof competing 
hegemonic projects. Finally, the concept of hegemonic projects places power 
contestation around economic and political ideas at the heart of understanding 
integration. The (contrasting) elitist bases of neofuntionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism are challenged. Integration outcomes are complex; they 
are not reducible to theories that privilege one of class, economic interests, 
functionalism or the instrumentalism of states. 
 
 By setting out what we term critical integration theory, and illustrating it ǯǡ-
conceive integration theorising that both sheds new light and gives a fuller ǮǯǤ 
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